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Abstract
Background: Since 2000, R&D financing for global health has increased significantly, with innovative proposals for
further increases. However, although venture capital (VC) funding has fostered life sciences businesses across the
developed world, its application in the developing world and particularly in Africa is relatively new. Is VC feasible in
the African context, to foster the development and application of local health innovation?
As the most industrially advanced African nation, South Africa serves as a test case for life sciences venture fund-
ing. This paper analyzes Bioventures, the first VC company focused on life sciences investment in sub-Saharan
Africa. The case study method was used to analyze the formation, operation, and investment support of Bioven-
tures, and to suggest lessons for future health venture funds in Africa that aim to develop health-oriented
innovations.
Discussion: The modest financial success of Bioventures in challenging circumstances has demonstrated a proof of
concept that life sciences VC can work in the region. Beyond providing funds, support given to investees included
board participation, contacts, and strategic services. Bioventures had to be proactive in finding and supporting
good health R&D.
Due to the fund’s small size, overhead and management expenses were tightly constrained. Bioventures was at
times unable to make follow-on investments, being forced instead to give up equity to raise additional capital, and
to sell health investments earlier than might have been optimal. With the benefit of hindsight, the CFO of Bioven-
tures felt that partnering with a larger fund might benefit similar future funds. Being better linked to market intelli-
gence and other entrepreneurial investors was also seen as an unmet need.
Summary: BioVentures has learned lessons about how the traditional VC model might evolve to tackle health
challenges facing Africa, including how to raise funds and educate investors; how to select, value, and support
investments; and how to understand the balance between financial and social returns. The experience of the fund
suggests that future health funds targeting ailments of the poor might require investors that accept health benefits
as part of their overall “return.” Learning from Bioventures may help develop health innovation funding for sub-
Saharan African that has combined health, financial, and economic development impacts.
Background
Since 2000, R&D financing for neglected diseases has
increased significantly. In 2008, almost US$3.1 billion
was invested in this area, with HIV/AIDS, malaria and
tuberculosis initiatives comprising close to three-quar-
ters of investment [1]. There have been innovative pro-
posals for further development of funding mechanisms
and sources [2]. However, although venture capital (VC)
funding has fostered life sciences businesses across the
developed world, its application in the developing world
and particularly in Africa is relatively new. Is VC feasible
in the African context, to foster the development and
application of local health innovation?
VC funds invest in new enterprises, by providing
financing and support that helps to scale up promising
technologies and business ideas. For decades, venture
capital has been used in developed countries to move
health technologies from idea to implementation and
widespread adoption [3].
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health business models in the African context [4]. While
South Africa is a relatively unfamiliar destination for
investment from funds based in wealthier countries, it
does have solid science, and more capacity and wealth
than other countries in sub-Saharan Africa [5]. At the
same time, it faces a number of significant health chal-
lenges including a high incidence of HIV/AIDS and TB,
and its population displays a mix of developed and
developing world health profiles.
This paper analyzes Bioventures, the first VC fund
focused on life sciences investment in sub-Saharan
Africa. Based in South Africa, Bioventures was headed
from 2001 onward by CEO Heather Sherwin. This 80
million rand (~$US 12M) fund has invested in 8 home-
grown companies since 2002, such as Disa Vascular, a
creator of stents for coronary and peripheral artery dis-
ease (see Table 1). Despite being a pioneer in the region,
Bioventures achieved solid though not stellar returns.
We used a case study design. Our analysis is based on
semi-structured interviews with key informants, site vis-
its in Cape Town in South Africa, and analysis of peer-
reviewed literature, news reports, government and NGO
reports, and web sites. We conducted interviews with
personnel of Bioventures and related organizations
Acorn, Cape Biotech, Disa Vascular, and Real World
Diagnostics between October 2007 and June 2009. Bio-
ventures was asked to fact-check the case study; the
analysis and interpretation is our own. All quotes are
from the interviews unless otherwise noted, and with
permission. This study was approved by the Office of
Research Ethics of the University of Toronto.
We begin by describing the formation and investment
summary of Bioventures. The investment process is
then discussed in detail, as this is a key function that
venture capitalists must adapt to new settings. One
investee, Disa Vascular, is considered in depth. Finally,
the challenge of bringing a “health return on invest-
ment” into the VC model is discussed, and lessons from
the case as a whole considered, including adapting the
VC model to work in lower-resource settings to help
foster local health innovation.
Discussion
Founding and investment summary
Formation of the Bioventures fund was begun in 2000
by Heather Sherwin who had completed her PhD in cell
biology in South Africa followed by an MBA. As stated
on its web site, “Bioventures believes firmly in the ability
of South Africa to develop a quality biotechnology
industry that consists of companies that compete with
the best in the world [6].” A private placement memor-
andum to pitch the fund was produced in 2001 and
marketed to various investors. Both the International
Finance Corporation (IFC) and South Africa’s Industrial
Development Corporation invested, attracted by both
the developmental and financial potential of domestic
biotechnology. According to Sherwin, the fund benefited
from approaching investors in the middle of the dot
com boom, since biotech was seen as being one of the
next big investment areas.
The final trust deed was signed on November 30,
2001. Bioventures was formally established in late 2001,
with a relatively small capital base of 80 million rand
(approx $US 12 million). As the CEO of the new fund,
S h e r w i n( a n dt h ef u n di t s e l f )w a sb a s e di nC a p eT o w n ,
South Africa. Paul Miot of Johannesburg was brought in
as the CFO; a chartered accountant with an MBA from
London Business School, he had worked in banks and
was already managing a general private equity fund, and
his financial focus was complementary to Sherwin’s
scientific background.
Investments started in 2002, and by 2004 the fund had
made all its investments. From 2002 to 2009,
Table 1 Bioventures Investment Summary
Investee Summary Return
Shimoda Biotech One drug licensed and on market; 10 in various stages of development and trials; mostly enhanced generics.
Company sold to Abraxis Biotech in 2008.
2.5x
Amandla Water
Systems
Waste water bioremediation technology worked, but business model failed from long infrastructure tendering
cycles and reliance on large water companies.
0x
Disa Vascular Develops and produces stents for cardiac and other arteries, to keep previously blocked arteries open. 3x, not yet
exited.
Synexa Life
Sciences
Proprietary bioprocessing technology for production of natural compounds and recombinant proteins. 2.5x, not yet
exited.
Electric Genetics Bioinformatics spin-out from University of the Western Cape. Sector as a whole did poorly. 0x
Mbuyu Biotech Joint venture with Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, to commercialize the Council’s bio-processing
technologies.
1x
PlatCo
Technologies
Jointly owned with Shimoda Biotech, set up to explore the potential for novel platinum based anti-cancer
compounds. Sold to Abraxis in 2008.
7x
Natural
Carotenoids SA
Focuses on production and extraction of carotenoids from algae, for food, cosmetics, pharma industries. 1.5x, not yet
exited.
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of eight investments, final results once all investments
were exited (estimated to happen in 2010) were pro-
jected to be two outright failures, two break-evens
which returned only the initial investment, three which
returned between 2 and 3 times, and one which
returned between 5 and 7 times. This represents a solid
but not spectacular return – a proof of concept that it
is possible to do life sciences investments in South
Africa and make money.
Choosing investees
To choose its 8 investments, Bioventures had to go
through over 300 proposals; some came from universi-
ties, others from local scientists and entrepreneurs. Bio-
ventures benefited from having no local competitors in
the sector of life sciences VC. The South African indus-
try itself was small enough that Sherwin knew some of
the investees beforehand. The early-stage R&D could
require active involvement on the part of the investor,
even to the extent of setting up a company to commer-
cialize the science – indeed, Bioventures started three
companies to commercialize good technologies.
Bioventures management reported that many propo-
sals were poor quality, and many others too early stage.
Although the fund’s goal of investing in great science,
developing it, and selling the investment for a good
price was the same as with developed market funds,
Sherwin notes it took more work to develop investees
than a developed market fund might typically give: “The
perfect business plan with the perfect management team
and the perfect science all patented in the right coun-
tries just doesn’t walk through the door...you’ve got to
be entrepreneurial and create those businesses yourself.”
Since it was difficult for South Africa to compete with
I n d i aa n dC h i n ai nm a n u f a c t u r i n g ,R & D - b a s e db u s i -
nesses were seen by Bioventures management to have
more potential, with South Africa’sr e g u l a t o r ye n v i r o n -
ment and perceived quality advantages playing a sup-
porting role. Proactively seeking out investments was
necessary. The people involved in the investee compa-
nies were often PhDs who left university for the busi-
ness world, and were sometimes proactively recruited to
form companies directly from universities based on the
potential of their research.
Supporting investees
Along with funding, Bioventures supported the compa-
nies it invested in with life sciences experience, a net-
work of contacts, and value-added services. Both
Sherwin and Miot recalled significant value in simply
“being there”:s t a y i n gi nr e g u l a rc o n tact with investees,
learning about human relations and management issues
in investees during visits, and using this tacit knowledge
to give better, personalized advice and guidance to its
investees. As Sherwin put it, “A lot of what I look for
when I go visit the businesses – a n dt h i si sw h yi ti ss o
important in VCs to be on the ground, because you
couldn’t manage a VC fund remotely – it’st h ea t m o -
sphere in the business...You see how people are relating
to the bosses....If there is a secretary, you know every-
thing in the business from them, and you see the rela-
tionships. It’s subtle things, it’s part of the due diligence
that you do on a business...”
A particular challenge for a small fund is spending
time on management, investee support, and investment
analysis – all activities that may increase overhead costs
and thus reduce the fund’s return on investment. This
has been identified as one barrier to smaller funds that
would invest in global health innovation [7]. For Bioven-
tures, Sherwin had to balance business support and
development activities with making a return, yet knew
she didn’t have a choice about providing companies
with the support they needed – if the support wasn’t
provided, the return wouldn’t be made.
As a small fund, overhead had to be kept to a mini-
mum. CFO Paul Miot managed a separate private equity
fund and had his own fund management company,
which gave him the financial flexibility to become
involved part time at Bioventures. As the only full time
employee, Sherwin worked on potential deals and inves-
tee interaction full time; Miot became more involved
when new opportunities came along. Although this lean
cost structure was essential to making the fund viable,
Miot felt that future funds should be larger, to benefit
from economies of scale and get the human resources
necessary to fully realize opportunities. Sherwin did note
one upside: she thought her investees appreciated the
fact that “we live the same lifestyle as our entrepreneurs
do”.
Valuing and exiting investees
A key step when investing into an R&D based business
is coming up with a valuation (i.e. estimated worth) of
how much the business will be worth in 3, 5, or 10
years. When valuing more mature companies, many
valuation methods are used, such as estimating future
income streams which are discounted appropriately for
risk. But since venture firms like Bioventures invest into
new companies, projecting future income is difficult –
especially in new sectors as biotechnology was in South
Africa.
One method Bioventures used was to agree with an
investee company on figures for investment required
and future sales. However, two mechanisms were then
used to mitigate risk. The investment might be made in
parts, with later investments depending on milestones
being hit after earlier investments. And if income figures
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(Some caution was required in taking additional shares,
in order not to de-incentivize investee management by
reducing their ownership stake too far.)
Bioventures aimed to make much of its money back
on “exits,” when investments are sold off to purchasers.
A key exit strategy was to create IP (Intellectual Prop-
erty) that would be valuable enough for a US or Eur-
opean company to purchase. These equity exits differ
from the debt financing route used to grow a company
into a large manufacturing entity; Bioventures perceived
this to be a lower-return option in most cases, and one
with time scales longer than might be suitable for the
fund.
Sherwin reported that an IPO (initial public offering)
on local stock exchanges would have been challenging,
as local investors tended to be risk averse and less famil-
iar with R&D based health businesses. Another exit
strategy was to do an IPO on foreign exchanges, with
the Swiss exchange being explored for investee Disa
Vascular due to Swiss investors’ long history with
healthcare.
Two other investees, PlatCoa n dS h i m o d a ,w e r es o l d
to Abraxis Bioscience – a biotechnology company trad-
ing on the NASDAQ exchange in the US that has can-
cer therapeutics as one focus. According to Reuters,
Abraxis acquired the full equity of both Shimoda and
Platco for an initial payment of US$15 million, plus
potential additional payments if specified milestones
were met [8].
Disa Vascular: the investee point of view
Disa Vascular, mentioned in the previous section, was
one of Bioventures’ more successful investees – as t e n t
company that built itself from an R&D operation into a
full-scale medical device manufacturer.
Gregory Starke, CEO of Disa Vascular and co-founder
with Damian Conway, studied orthopedics and cardiol-
ogy at the University of Cape Town, whose faculty
member Christiaan Barnard performed the world’sf i r s t
heart transplant in the late 1960s. After several years of
consulting for local orthopedics companies, he and col-
leagues decided in late 1999 to develop their own coron-
ary stents, with savings from their consulting work
followed by a small angel investment (i.e. small initial
investment) in 2000. As Starke recalled, “It was a much
bigger leap then we realized…we had a lot of cardiology
e x p e r t i s ea r o u n dt h a tw ec o u l dg e th o l do f .B u to nt h e
commercial side, both the production and the ultimate
s e l l i n go ft h ei m p l a n t ,w ew e r ee x t r e m e l yn a i v ea n d
really had no idea of the massive challenges that faced
us on actually producing an implant, getting the various
certifications etc. and then commercializing it in a pro-
fessional and normal manner.”
Disa’s management decided early on to pursue
European regulatory approval for their coronary stent
product, wanting to differentiate themselves in terms of
quality perception. Although the device’s South African
origins did not in itself pose difficulties for European
regulators, Disa Vascular’s management did find it diffi-
cult to find local people experienced in taking a new
biomedical device through the regulatory process, and
later developed this expertise in-house.
Receiving European regulatory approval opened more
doors for Disa in international markets, which Starke
noted had the unanticipated side effect of causing them
to lose focus on the South African market. In practice,
t h e yd i dn o th a v es u f f i c i e n tf u n d st og ot ot r a d es h o w s ,
do marketing, follow up on leads, and otherwise break
into competitive international markets. An experience
with an Irish company that licensed the product also
turned out poorly, with the Irish company reneging on
the agreement once they saw that Disa didn’th a v et h e
resources to pursue legal action. Disa’s management
rethought their strategy, and came back with new pro-
ducts and investment from Bioventures, and a more
mature understanding of markets, branding, and work-
ing with distributors.
With a better understanding of “what all the rules
w e r ea n dt h ew a y st og e tap r o d u c tt om a r k e t , ” Disa
Vascular has had a more typical sales operation for the
past several years, with distribution in about a dozen
countries in Latin America, Europe, and Asia. As of
June 2008, Disa had sold about 6000 stents, with a pro-
duct line focused on technology for the treatment of
coronary and peripheral artery disease, including bare
metal stents, catheters, and angiography accessories; the
stents had received European certification, and were
structurally designed to reduce restenosis (re-narrowing
of the artery after stenting due to a build up of scar tis-
sue). A new coated and drug-eluting stent was also
undergoing clinical trials [9].
According to Starke, he first met with Heather Sher-
win when Bioventures was still in the process of raising
funds. In 2002, Disa made an offer to its angel investors
that was underwritten by Bioventures, thus enabling the
exit of the angel investors while bringing new money
into the business. Bioventures invested approximately $2
million, with about $1.3 million coming into the com-
pany, and the remainder going to the angel investors.
Disa subsequently got another investment of a little less
than $US 1 million along with a loan for capital equip-
ment purchase, both from South Africa’sI n d u s t r i a l
Development Corporation.
Although these investments let the company survive
and grow, and do development and marketing locally,
Starke found them to be insufficient to travel to big
congresses or take the business global, thus hampering
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lenges to be getting partners such as cardiologists
involved in the testing and development of the stents,
doing sales effectively in an organization filled with engi-
neers, coming to terms with ‘soft marketing’ aspects of
medical device sales, and a lack of mentorship and local
industry experts to network with.
In considering what had drawn Disa to accept funding
from Bioventures, Starke reflected that money was natu-
rally the most immediate draw, but that the knowledge,
experience, and connections that Bioventures had from
being an exclusively life-sciences focused investment
firm were also attractive. Conversely, he thought Sher-
win saw several attractive features in Disa: clinical cred-
ibility, highly motivated management, and a medical
device company with shorter investment and regulatory
time frames than a drug development company would
have. According to Sherwin and Miot, Disa was consid-
ered a success story for Bioventures.
Beyond the monetary investment, Bioventures sup-
ported Disa in several ways. Both Sherwin and Miot
were on Disa’s board of directors. When Disa’s manage-
ment was looking for additional investment from a Eur-
opean shareholder, they had narrowed options down to
Adamant Biomedical (Basel) and Nordic Biotech (Den-
mark); Sherwin stepped in to look at the term sheets
and other details, and helped close the deal with Ada-
mant. Disa paid Bioventures a percentage fee for helping
to make the fund investment happen – t h eo n l ys u c h
fee for service asked by Bioventures, according to both
Starke and Sherwin.
Fund performance
The distribution of returns on the investees of the Fund
as of 2009 is shown in Table 1. Overall, Sherwin
reported that the Fund made money overall, earning a
modest but not stellar rate of return from 2001 to 2009
(the exact figure is proprietary).
PlatCo, the investment with the best returns at 7
times initial investment, reportedly made roughly an
80% internal rate of return over the life of the invest-
ment. Based on public statements, PlatCo’sb u y e r
Abraxis Bioscence was willing to pay for it because the
anti-cancer health technology was seen as having huge
potential [8]. Sherwin and Miot felt that in principle
Bioventures itself could have taken those products into
clinical trials and perhaps made a 20x return instead of
7x, but it didn’t have the time or the money available.
PlatCo was almost a virtual company, composed of one
researcher, several students, and space rented from a
university; as such, its overhead was extremely low.
Bioventures was faced with a landscape in South
Africa where there were few established life sciences
innovators, be it in biotechnology or in non-generic
pharmaceuticals. All of its investees were early stage
R&D companies. Challenges included dilution due to
inadequate capitalization, investment choices, a fund
lifespan which was short for doing biotechnology in a
new location, and operating in a challenging environ-
ment. The Fund’s short lifespan of only 7 years nomin-
ally ended in November 2008, though Sherwin had
arranged for a two-year extension period to wind down
some investments such as Disa Vascular in a more mea-
sured way.
Balancing financial and social return on investment
Given the overhead and risks involved, Sherwin was ulti-
mately forced to consider whether a typical high “VC
rate of return” was achievable, or even a desirable goal
to aim for.
Despite Bioventures’ location in South Africa, financial
pressures necessitated a focus on developed-world dis-
eases. Diseases whose patients are mostly poor don’t
represent attractive financial investment opportunities,
absent third-party financial support for innovation. One
investee of Bioventures in drug discovery started an HIV
program along with a pain treatment program, but was
forced to cancel the HIV program for perceived insuffi-
cient payback. As Sherwin said, “If you follow your pure
VC mandate, you cannot be invested in TB companies,
in HIV companies – you’re just not going to get your
returns.”
Both Sherwin and Miot had thoughts on this balance.
Sherwin suggested one analogy for future funds would
be microfinance funds, which have pooled investment
capital into fund structures, invested the funds into a
portfolio of microfinance enterprises, and rewarded the
original investors with a combined financial return and
social impact return. This “mixed model” investment
fund for healthcare companies might invest in those
African countries with political stability and populations
which can pay for better health care. Such a fund would
focus on shorter-term investments that scale up existing
health delivery models. For example, investing into a
clinic might have a 5 to 7 year time frame to get a loan
paid back, as compared to a risky new drug which
might require a 10+ year time frame. At least one such
fund has been started since Sherwin made this sugges-
tion [10].
Miot thought that wealthy investors and social invest-
ment funds might well put money into an “Africa
Healthcare Fund”, although the larger potential investors
from pension funds might be constrained by real or per-
ceived fiduciary obligations to focus purely on maximiz-
ing financial returns. “I think there are a lot of wealthy
entrepreneurs and socal investment funds out there who
say if you are coming up with a TB [intervention] that
is going to help bring down the rate of TB in Africa and
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suggested wealthy investors might like to get involved in
social investing, where they made a modest return such
as 5%, while being part of something that has made a
significant difference in Africa. Pension funds driven by
giving returns to their investors might give a small por-
tion of their funds under management, depending on
their legal and moral obligations.
Lessons learned
Appreciate scales of time and money
After running Bioventures, Sherwin better appreciated
the time and money it takes to see investments through
to success: “Timeframe and quantum of money I think
has just surprised everyone, and not just in South
Africa, but everywhere – just how much money it does
take to get it there, to get biotech there.”
Miot felt that access to larger amounts of capital for
highly promising investments would be a key feature to
be built into future local funds. He suggested partnering
with a fund overseas which had more money, so that
the local fund would find and grow the investment initi-
ally and then exit to the overseas partner fund, which in
turn would benefit from a risk-mitigated series of high-
quality deals in an emerging market.
Comparing a fund with $10 million to invest against
one with $100 million to invest, the overhead as a frac-
tion of funds under management is typically higher for
the smaller fund. The smaller fund thus finds it more
difficult to provide value-added services, as they may
come out of the core bottom line. While investees such
as Starke felt that Bioventures had added value, addres-
sing the issue of overhead is essential to making smaller
funds work, such as through technical assistance or
mentoring provided by third parties on a non-profit
basis. Similar issues are likely to arise in the establish-
ment of any large Southern fund focused on investing
for health impact.
Educate investors about life sciences and emerging
economies
Sherwin noted that the IFC (International Finance Cor-
poration), as a large, sophisticated, global investor into
Bioventures, had a good understanding of what biotech
is and what it requires. This was not the case with some
other investors, who compared the performance of Bio-
ventures unfavourably with that of funds in other areas
such as IT. Sherwin suggested “I think part of it is us
educating them in the beginning, to what they’re getting
into…in raising [future funds], even if we end up turn-
ing down investors or we lose investors, we know that
the investors we have really understand what they’re
doing. It makes a big difference.”
One might question the degree to which Bioventures
was truly a “Southern” innovator, given that South
Africa is wealthier than its local peers and the modus
operandi of Bioventures seems not dissimilar from Wes-
tern biotech funds. While these are valid points, several
features make Bioventures distinct from its Western
counterparts. First, the fund size is quite small relative
to Western life sciences VC funds. Second, although
South Africa has significant wealth, it also contains huge
amounts of poverty and need, including one of the most
significant HIV/AIDS problems worldwide. Third, the
fund’s location in Africa and isolation from both mar-
kets and peers form barriers to success. Fourth, local
conditions such as market opportunities and external
perceptions of South Africa affected the fund’so p e r a -
tional characteristics. Lastly, the CEO faced decisions
regarding whether to pursue a typical VC path or to
pursue investments oriented more toward local health
impacts – the decisions taken by Bioventures, and the
corresponding future fund opportunities suggested by
Sherwin, form an important learning from the case.
With the above in mind, potential investors from Eur-
ope and North America may see risks in investing in
emerging economies. However, the solid performance of
Bioventures is a positive proof point, and Sherwin
believed political and currency risk would be low for off-
shore investors. Such investors might also be motivated
by greater upside potential, given the growing scientific
and entrepreneurial strengths of the South. If and when
future funds are set up which directly target local health
impact, they will be able to benefit from past fund
experiences in the region.
Learn from peers and previous fund managers
Both of the partners in Bioventures thought that more
peer learning and linkages would be useful. Miot specu-
lated, “What would I find useful? I think to know that
there is a community out there, to get in contact with
similar companies who are maybe further down the
path...You are part of the community, and someone
could look at presentations that might be public knowl-
edge, etc.” Sherwin similarly felt that networking with
domestic and foreign VCs who have solved related chal-
lenges a number of times would be helpful. On the
investee side, Starke felt there was an opportunity for
shared or low-cost health market intelligence, “where we
wish to deal with a company in country X but know
absolutely nothing about the conditions in that country.”
Sherwin noted the importance of being able to make
decisions based on imperfect information, and taking
calculated risks. The independence was also a big draw
as compared to a corporate finance position, despite a
lower salary. Finally, she emphasized the job satisfaction
rewards of her work: “I love working with entrepreneurs,
I love the fact that I’ve been at the forefront of this
industry in South Africa. I get a real thrill out of seeing
companies like Disa go from two guys in a garage to
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founders and managers of future health funds.
Increase support and follow-on investing for Southern
funds
Based on her experience with Bioventures, Sherwin sug-
gested that non-profit funds or services might act as an
initial hands-on stage to mentor and grow seed ven-
tures, with high-potential ventures which successfully
graduate then receiving follow-on investing. (The Acorn
paper in this BMC series describes one such biotechnol-
ogy incubation service [11].)
Depending on their financial profit potential, this fol-
low-on investing would be either from a mixed-return
fund with relatively modest financial return expecta-
tions, or from a purely financial fund. This aligns with
ideas that have been discussed of designing the charac-
ter of investment capital to match a combination of
financial, health, and development goals [12,13]. More
appropriate types of investment could be combined with
harnessing educated diaspora populations, as India and
C h i n ah a v ed o n es os u c c e s s f u l l y .A sS h e r w i nn o t e d ,
“There’s a large number of Ghanaians and Nigerians
and South Africans and Kenyans living abroad who are
very highly qualified and skilled. And it’st i m et os t a r t
trying to attract these people back.”
Summary
While Bioventures has been a modest and not stellar
success financially, it represents a significant accom-
plishment: creating a life sciences investment fund in
Africa, which has shown proof of concept for investing
into R&D based health technologies and creating viable
businesses on the ground.
Although South Africa is more economically devel-
oped than the rest of sub-Saharan Africa, the fund faced
several challenges common to the region, including
local capacity constraints and developing IP in the glo-
bal economy. At the same time, it benefited from posi-
tive aspects of the South African context, such as
entrepreneurs with personal initiative, private and insti-
tutional investment, a positive economic climate, avail-
ability of skilled personnel, and a reasonably stable
financial and legal climate. In transplanting the venture
model elsewhere in Africa, the presence or absence of
such factors must be taken into account.
Beyond providing funds, the support given to investees
included board participation, contacts, and strategic ser-
vices. Bioventures had to be proactive in finding and
supporting good R&D, and not merely wait for the ideal
company to walk through the door. Providing hands-on
support to early-stage health ventures posed problems –
due to the fund’s relatively small size, overhead and
management expenses were tightly constrained. Bioven-
tures sometimes wasn’t able to make follow-on
investments, being forced instead to give up equity to
raise follow-on investment capital.
With the benefit of hindsight, the CFO of Bioventures
Paul Miot felt that partnering with a larger fund might
be the way to go. He thought that a small technology-
oriented fund such as Bioventures might act as a sort of
technology scout and early stage developer, with the lar-
ger fund being available for follow-on investments as
successful investees grew.
Being better linked to market intelligence and other
entrepreneurs was seen as an unmet need – to “people
w h oh a v ed o n ei tb e f o r e . ” T h ee x p e r i e n c eo ft h ef u n d
also suggests that future health care technology funds
targeting ailments of the poor might require investors to
accept health benefits as part of their overall “return.”
Based on her experience, the CEO of Bioventures has
considered several future African fund models balancing
health returns with financial returns. (See the Venture
Funding article in this BMC series [14].)
While not yet targeting the tougher health challenges
facing the continent as a whole, BioVentures has learned
lessons about how the traditional VC model might
change to tackle those health challenges, yet still retain
the risk-accepting spirit that has turned promising ideas
into reality in other technological fields. Lessons learned
include how to raise funds and find “educated inves-
tors”; how to select, value, and support investments; and
how to evaluate different models for investment funds
targeting health products and services.
In the broader African context, few if any sub-Saharan
countries currently have a sufficient scientific base to
support a large fund investing solely in early-stage R&D
for advanced health technologies. However, there may
be scope for funds which invest in a wider range of
health technologies, which invest across multiple coun-
tries to find sufficient promising technologies, and
which provide support, technical assistance, and finan-
cing links to help boost domestic African innovation
[13]. Similarly, funds which have already been started on
the health delivery side suggest the potential viability of
co-investing in health technologies along with health
delivery systems. The challenge facing those who would
invest in health innovation in Africa is to learn from
examples like Bioventures, and develop viable health
innovation funding that combines health, financial, and
economic development impacts.
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